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Abstract Recently, there is increased attention to the integration of moral values
into the conception, design, and development of emerging IT. The most reviewed
approach for this purpose in ethics and technology so far is Value-Sensitive Design
(VSD). This article considers VSD as the prime candidate for implementing nor-
mative considerations into design. Its methodology is considered from a conceptual,
analytical, normative perspective. The focus here is on the suitability of VSD for
integrating moral values into the design of technologies in a way that joins in with
an analytical perspective on ethics of technology. Despite its promising character, it
turns out that VSD falls short in several respects: (1) VSD does not have a clear
methodology for identifying stakeholders, (2) the integration of empirical methods
with conceptual research within the methodology of VSD is obscure, (3) VSD runs
the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy when using empirical knowledge for
implementing values in design, (4) the concept of values, as well as their realization,
is left undetermined and (5) VSD lacks a complimentary or explicit ethical theory
for dealing with value trade-offs. For the normative evaluation of a technology, I
claim that an explicit and justiﬁed ethical starting point or principle is required.
Moreover, explicit attention should be given to the value aims and assumptions of a
particular design. The criteria of adequacy for such an approach or methodology
follow from the evaluation of VSD as the prime candidate for implementing moral
values in design.
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Introduction: New Technologies Challenging Ethics
Until the late twentieth century, technology was commonly regarded as value-
neutral, i.e. mainly of instrumental value to human endeavours and activities (see,
e.g., Florman 1987). Recently, this conception of technology has been extensively
challenged. One of the ﬁrst prominent contemporary critics of the natural view of
technology was Langdon Winner. He argued that technology is not value-neutral,
but instead exhibits moral and political choices. He provided a compelling example
of the highway overpasses built by Robert Moses, a famous and inﬂuential New
York architect of urban planning (Winner 1980). In the 1930s Robert Moses was
asked to design overpasses for the only highway connecting New York to Long
Island, leading to Long Island Beach. Remarkably, Moses designed these bridges
very low. The way they were built only allowed for cars to pass under whereas
public transport (busses) passing under was rendered impossible. Supposedly, this
implied Robert Moses favored highways over public transport and community needs
in his design. some have argued that the highway overpasses were intentionally
designed low so as to prevent public busses, the main means of transportation for
the least well-off, including racial minorities, from getting to Long Island beach
(Winner 1980).
Although there has been some dispute about whether this consequence was
actually intended in the design (Joerges 1999), thanks to its strong illustrative power
the example of Moses’ low hanging bridges is often used to exemplify the possible
political and moral import of design choices. Other examples of the inherent moral
and political import of technology include the discussion of online search engines
(Zimmer 2008; Introna and Nissenbaum 2000), soft- and hardware codes (Lessig
1999), databases and classiﬁcation systems (Bowker and Star 1999), cookies on
personal computers (Elmer 2004) and many more. A related value-laden phenom-
enon concerns the way in which information is presented, such as the presentation
of risks associated with technology (Asveld and Roeser 2009) or the degree of
reliability of information on the Internet (Vedder and Wachbroit 2003). The
political and moral dimensions of technology have been recognized and have
become important research topics in the philosophy and ethics of technology.
Proponents of this account not only weigh and assess the risks and beneﬁts of (new)
technologies, but also address the issue of how technologies impact upon our moral
decisions, actions, and ultimately, upon our lives. In light of the value-ladenness of
technology it is highly desirable to have at our disposal means for ethically
evaluating and justifying decision-making during technology design.
The increased awareness of possible implications of our design and our design
choices for the expression, support, or undermining of our (political and) moral
values contributes to an understandable desire to control and inﬂuence this process:
Would it be possible to design our buildings, technologies, and institutions, so that
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123they reﬂect, express, and enhance our moral and political views? Let us, for the
purpose of this paper, set aside political values and focus on the practice of
enhancing and incorporating the integration of moral values into the design of
Information Technology.
1
In this paper I explore the criteria of adequacy for a methodology of ethics of
technology while considering which normative considerations are implemented in
design. I will consider and discuss Value-Sensitive Design (VSD), the most
reviewed approach pertaining to values in technology design so far, as the prime
candidate for such a methodology. First I describe the methodology as put forward
by VSD in section 2. In the next section this approach is critically discussed from a
conceptual, analytical perspective. The focus of this discussion is on the suitability
of the VSD approach for integrating moral values into the design of technologies in
a way that joins in with an analytical perspective on ethics of technology. From this
follow the criteria of adequacy for an approach or methodology to implement moral
values in design in the section ‘‘Towards Value Conscious Design.’’
Value-Sensitive Design
Human beings are confronted on a daily basis with the design, development and use,
of (new) technologies that in some way impact upon them. Technological
innovations in the ﬁeld of information and communication technology (IT) have
enabled the expansion of our social and political lives and activities to a global
level—one of tremendous networks such as Instant Messaging services (MSN or
Trillian), Skype, YouTube, MySpace, Flickr, Hyves, Twitter, and Facebook.
One of the prominent approaches for evaluating values in technology design—
and information technologies especially—is VSD.
2 VSD propounds a proactive
approach regarding (the incorporation of) values in design, characterized by Van
den Hoven as a way to ‘frontload ethics’ (2005, 2008).
VSD emerged in the 1990s proceeding from the insights of ‘‘human-computer
interaction studies.’’
3 It started from the recognition that when designing informa-
tion technologies, the predominant, traditional focus of engineers is on function-
ality; the primary interests of engineers concern usability, efﬁciency, reliability, and
affordability of (new) technologies. An engineer’s principal concern is to make a
technology which has the required functionality. Yet there is more to technological
innovation. As mentioned above, technology should not be considered to be value-
neutral, but rather to have moral (and political) impacts on humans and their
environment. Decisions made during the design process have value implications
1 The main methodological point of this paper however, holds for (values in) design in general.
2 Several authors in the ﬁeld of values in design draw attention to human and moral values as an integral
part of the conception, design, and development of technological artifacts and systems. These include
Design for Values (Camp 2003), Values at Play (Flanagan et al. 2005; Flanagan et al. 2008), Value-
Sensitive Design (Friedman 2004; Friedman et al. 2006), Values in Engineering Design (Van de Poel
2009) and Disclosive Computer Ethics (Brey 2001).
3 For an academic overview of the ﬁeld see Jacko and Sears (2007).
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but constitutive: it shapes our practices and institutions in important ways, such as
those of health care and transportation, as Van den Hoven argues (2005, 2008)
Possibilities pertaining to (new) technologies are created as a direct or indirect
consequence of design decisions whereas other possibilities are taken away. As a
result, technologies can promote or undermine speciﬁc human values.
This is not to say values are solely designed into technology, nor solely conveyed
by social drivers and forces. Inﬂuence is exerted in various ways, from the direction
of the designers of a technology as well as from its users and stakeholders. When
new technologies are designed and introduced, users may apply them for purposes
other than those intended in design.
4 By doing so, technologies evolve, i.e. their
functionality is adjusted and changed. This is what is referred to in VSD as an
interactional position; design and social context and the interaction between both
matter (Friedman and Kahn 2003).
Special VSD projects have been carried out for companies like Microsoft (on the
reusing and sharing of information, such as code) and Intel. Numerous other
projects have been taken up in the academic sphere, such as the RAPUNSEL project
(involving the design of games for girls), projects dealing with informed consent
online (via cookies and web browsers), network security, and projects in the ﬁeld of
human-robotic interaction or in the ﬁeld of display technology. VSD assumes that:
[h]uman values and ethical considerations no longer stand apart from the
human-computer interaction (HCI) community but are fundamentally part of
our practice. This shift reﬂects, at least in part, the increasing impact and
visibility that computer technologies have had on human lives. Technology
may support/enhance and/or undermine/corrupt human values. E.g. informa-
tion available on the Internet increases access to and use of information, but
might entail infringement of privacy or the dissemination of incorrect, false
information (Friedman 2004).
In order to do justice to these moral (and political) implications, VSD is
employed as a methodology that ‘seeks to design technology that accounts for
human values in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design
process.’ (Friedman et al. 2000) What is more, VSD is a ‘way of doing ethics that
aims at making moral values part of technological design, research, and
development,’ says Van den Hoven (2005). In this paper this claim is investigated,
by exploring whether VSD is indeed suitable as a methodology for designing values
into technology. I start by describing the VSD methodology below.
4 Although the intended instrumental value of a technology or technological artifact is inherent to its
intentional history (Vermaas and Houkes 2004), in complex technology development we are not able to
foresee or predict the exact use and consequences of the (overall, ﬁnal) technology due to uncertainty, i.e.
a lack of information. This relates to what Anders Albrechtslund coins the ‘positivist problem,’ the fact
that there is a problematic relation between intended design and ﬁnal use (Albrechtslund 2007). The use
of a technology is not linear-causally determined by design, but plays out in practice, in a speciﬁc context
of use. In consequence, there are many possible ways (multi-stability) in which a technology can be used
in practice.
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VSD is characterized by Friedman et al. (2002a) as an approach that:
brings forward a unique constellation of features. First, Value-Sensitive
Design seeks to be proactive: to inﬂuence the design of information
technology early in and throughout the design phase. Second, Value-Sensitive
Design enlarges the arena where values arise to include not only the work
place […] but also education, the home, commerce, online communities, and
public life. Third, Value-Sensitive Design enlarges the scope of human values
beyond those of cooperation […] and participation and democracy […]t o
include all values, especially those with moral import. Fourth, Value-Sensitive
Design contributes a unique integrative methodology that involves conceptual,
empirical, and technical investigations. [..]
VSD evaluates and informs (the development of) technologies by taking into
account human values. It sets out an integrative and iterative tripartite methodology,
consisting of conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations (see, Friedman
et al. 2006 or Nissenbaum 2005). Each of the conceptual, empirical, and technical
investigations and analyses are carried out iteratively, mutually informing and being
informed by the other investigation. These interdependencies are metaphorically
described by Nissenbaum as ‘‘‘balls in the air’’: Conscientious designers must juggle
and keep in play the results of at least three modes, i.e. the results of empirical,
conceptual, and technical research (Nissenbaum 2005). The interaction among these
three distinct analyses—and so the assembly of these separate methodological
perspectives—is part of what makes the VSD an attractive enterprise.
The ﬁrst methodological part involves a philosophically informed conceptual
analysis. Its goal is to identify and articulate, on the one hand, the central values at
stake in a particular design context, and, on the other hand, the stakeholders that are
affected by this (technology) design.
Since this is its main goal or raison d’e ˆtre, the lion’s share of conceptual work in
VSD evidently involves values. VSD is related to values in a two-fold way. First, it
starts from the observation that design and technology may impact upon values:
(new) technology developments may enhance, threaten, or transform existing
values. For example, the advent of social networking sites has changed existing
conceptions of privacy, especially for younger generations (Livingstone 2008).
Secondly, values are fostered and built into design by means of VSD; it seeks to
identify values considered to be of importance for a target group, say a certain
company, society, or user group, and subsequently safeguarding these values by
designing them into technology.
Friedman maintains (2004; but also Friedman and Kahn 2003 and Friedman et al.
2006) that VSD particularly focuses on values with moral import that are often
implicated in technological developments, such as the values of human dignity,
justice, welfare, human rights, privacy, trust, informed consent, respect for
intellectual property rights, universal usability, environmental sustainability, moral
responsibility, accountability, honesty, and democracy. According to Mary Cum-
mings, ‘[w]hile neither independent nor exclusive, these values were selected in the
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technology and ethics literature, as well as those that have become more important
with the increasing use of computer technologies in everyday life’ (2006). She
argues that VSD does not employ ‘values’ as referring to something being of
economic worth, but that VSD takes up a broader sense of value: values refer to
what persons, either singularly or collectively, consider as important to their lives.
To complement the value investigation, VSD sets out to identify the stakeholders
of the technology in question. For VSD it is insufﬁcient to solely articulate the
central constructs of a design practice. This needs to be carried out recognising who
is affected and to what extent. Direct and indirect stakeholders are distinguished; the
former being those who interact directly with the new technology, the latter being
those that are affected in a less straightforward way (Friedman 2004).
The ﬁrst, rather abstract conceptual part of VSD’s methodology is complemented
with empirical investigation in the second part. Here the focus is on the way
stakeholders assess the technology in question. Both qualitative and quantitative
research from the empirical sciences are used to inform this part of the deliberation
process (Friedman 2004) ? focus groups, surveys, interviews, and measurements of
user behaviour are some of the methods employed to investigate the stakeholders’
assessment of the technology. The point of this research is to ﬁnd out how
stakeholders experience (new) technologies with regard to the values they consider
important in relation to their social environment and reference groups.
5 Moreover, it
concerns how they cope with emerging value conﬂicts. A primary consideration in
this phase of analysis is investigating in what way design trade-offs affect
perceptions, behaviours, and prioritization of competing values. This also includes
the way in which the designer can support or detract from a value conﬂict
(Cummings 2006). The results of these studies are applied for improving the design
of (new) technologies by making them more sensitive and compliant with
stakeholders’ values.
Whereas the focus in both conceptual and empirical investigations is on the
stakeholders’ perspective with regard to who they are, the values they hold and the
value implications of a particular (new) technology, the attention of the third part of
the methodology—the technical analysis—is directed more speciﬁcally to the
design and performance of the technology in question. As mentioned earlier,
decisions during the design process knowingly or unknowingly determine to a large
extent the way in which a given technology can be used in practice. Each particular
design creates certain possibilities for action and application, while at the same time
obstructing other possibilities. The technical part of the methodological investiga-
tion focuses primarily on how the technology can and will support, or compromise,
the human and moral values identiﬁed in the other parts. This is where VSD has a
pre-emptive stance with regard to ethics and technology: it purports to incorporate
the results of the conceptual and empirical phases into design in a proactive way
(Friedman 2004). As expounded by Van den Hoven, ‘Value-Sensitive Design
5 ‘[V]alues cannot be motivated only by an empirical account of the external world, but depend
substantively on the interests and desires of human beings within a cultural milieu’, Friedman et al.
(2006).
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way: by ‘‘frontloading ethics’’ and by all means the proactive integration of ethical
reﬂection in the stage of design’ (2005). The three parts
6 of the VSD methodology
are developed to secure the objective of not only making technology work, but
making it work sensitive to human and moral values.
Will VSD do?
A Discussion of VSD as a Methodology for Implementing Values in Design
from an Ethics of Technology Perspective
The potential of VSD as a proactive approach to ethics of technology is well
appreciated. It recognises the importance of designing technology conscious of
human and moral values over a mere retrospective perspective of discussing and
dealing with value considerations after a technology has already been introduced
and embedded in society. In contrast with retrospective analyses and the tailoring of
technology to the requirements and needs of users with hindsight, VSD supports
designing so that values are pre-emptively taken into account. What is more, VSD
seems especially appropriate in dealing with a potentially diverse user population
and the values they hold. However, in analysing whether VSD can meet the
requirements associated with a (normative) methodology for implementing values
in design (as part of ethics of technology), I argue that VSD falls short in a variety of
ways that I will now discuss.
Who are the Stakeholders?
Prior to the deployment of the VSD methodology, there is one basic issue that needs
to be resolved ﬁrst: How do we identify the stakeholders? This matter is of course
not speciﬁc to VSD. In any stakeholder analysis the identiﬁcation of stakeholders is
paramount (see e.g., Freeman 1994; Mitchell et al. 1997). However, the objective of
designing technology sensitive to - or even consciously and deliberately designed
for—human and moral values, demands a much more exhaustive and comprehen-
sive identiﬁcation of stakeholders in order to do justice to underlying issues of
fairness and equality. Whereas to meet the objective of designing a technology that
is proﬁtable, useful, or that warrants the inclusion of patently relevant stakeholders
for a large enough group, incorporating moral values calls for further-reaching
research in order to recognize who is affected by the technology in what way and to
what extent.
This may seem relatively unproblematic at ﬁrst sight, but in the case of more
complex technologies, identifying stakeholders becomes increasingly difﬁcult -
let alone identifying the indirect stakeholders. This by implication raises doubts as
to how the overall input provided by stakeholders, concerning their evaluation of a
6 These methodological parts can take part concurrently, though referred to by Flanagan et al. (2008)a s
‘phases’.
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stakeholder input in order to obtain a sufﬁcient and well-informed understanding of
stakeholder values?
Once the issue of the identiﬁcation of stakeholders is resolved, questions arise
such as how these stakeholders can be reached, how their input is gathered and
ﬁnally, how to deal with conﬂicting values. These sorts of issues are very important
and will be further addressed in the following sections.
How to Integrate Empirical Methods?
The second point of attention concerns the use of empirical methods in VSD. VSD
holds that it employs multiple methodologies of the social sciences to study how
both direct and indirect stakeholders assess new technologies, i.e. the values these
stakeholders render important in relation to a particular technology. The empirical
investigation results in knowledge concerning the values and opinions of the
stakeholders.
Consider the design of a medical system that supports decision-making for
patients suffering from aneurysms. The system advises patients regarding their
healthcare. In order to receive advice, the patients have to go online and ﬁll out a
questionnaire. What patients (and others) do not know is how the system comes to
its conclusions. Therefore, the system is said to be ‘opaque.’ In addition, the patients
are unaware of the available alternatives. Suppose we were to use VSD to evaluate
and improve the values in the design of this medical system by means of empirical
investigation. Now, imagine that one of the outcomes would be that a large part of
the stakeholders fear that their autonomy is seriously threatened. What does this tell
us and what can we learn from this information?
First of all, current technology development is often so complex that one can
question whether stakeholders are in a position to fully assess new technologies.
(New) Technologies are often so complex that they are unintelligible to most
people, for example due to incomplete information availability or for lack of
competence to assess the technology (how it functions, the possible effects on
people, the consequences it yields for the environment, and so on). In the case of the
medical decision support system described above, people may feel insecure because
the system is opaque and they are unaware of possible alternatives. Moreover,
people may err or have mistaken beliefs about factual and normative issues
concerning the technology. Secondly, and more fundamentally, it is unclear what
stakeholders actually intend to say when they are speaking of particular values.
7 Not
only is this dependent on the extent to which values are clearly deﬁned in the
(empirical) research, but also on the way the values are experienced and interpreted
in each particular situation or assessment. Consider the value of autonomy in the
example described above. Even if the deﬁnitions of values of stakeholders,
designers, and researchers were to correspond, still these values could be interpreted
differently, thereby generating different norms and actions.
7 This relates to the conceptualization of values cf. the subsection ‘‘What are Values.’’
278 N. Manders-Huits
123Without giving ground and substance to values, interviewing stakeholders seems
to be on loose grounds; as a result the values are too abstract and multi-interpretable,
ultimately undermining the legitimacy of the empirical component of VSD. The
outcome of research carried out by Friedman et al. (2002b) on users’ conceptions of
risks and harms on the web effectively illustrates this point. The study indicates that
users emphasise security, privacy, and threats to computer systems as the key harms
and risks associated with the web. These values and concepts, however, are not
substantially deﬁned in the research. Because, what does it mean if 67% of the users
say that they fear security issues? And do they all refer to the same conception of
security? In addition, how does the 67% fear of security problems relate to the 49%
fear of privacy issues? Hence, despite the fact that the associated empirical research
generates numerous results, Friedman, Nissenbaum et al. acknowledge that it is
difﬁcult to draw conclusions based on them (2002b). Lacking in this research and in
VSD in general, I claim, is reﬂection on how to deal with the (used) empirical
investigations concerning values. As a result it is unclear how the integration of
empirical studies relates to the overall—and especially the conceptual—investiga-
tion of VSD.
In addition, building on stakeholder opinions or evaluations as done in VSD
implies a shared and ﬁxed point of view:
8 it is assumed that stakeholders will have
an opinion and that this opinion is relatively stable. However, people’s opinions and
beliefs (including moral beliefs) change because of new information, insights, and
experiences. For example, people may be unaware of the implicit normativity of a
technology until this is experienced, as a result of which they may come to
disapprove. What is more, there is a plurality of values and normative positions in
the public domain, and VSD needs to reﬂect on the issue of dealing with this, e.g. in
case of persistent disagreement. Hence, this part of the methodology should be
deliberative rather than taking the form of a survey so that issues can be made
explicit and critically discussed.
The Naturalistic Fallacy
A third problem for VSD as a potential methodology for ethics of technology
concerns the way in which choices for speciﬁc design options are (normatively)
justiﬁed. As discussed, part of the VSD methodology consists of an empirical
investigation, i.e. exposing the values of stakeholders involved. There is an implicit
assumption in the methodology of VSD that one will know what to do in a
normative sense, once these values are known. This, I contend, is where VSD runs
the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy, i.e. by reducing an ‘is’ to an ‘ought.’
Indeed, Friedman et al. (2006) explicitly state that.
8 This relates to the issue whether the context for deciding between options is ’static’ or ’dynamic:’ in
static contexts, all options are known with a certain degree of probability regarding their consequences
(Schmidtz 1995, discussed by Van de Poel 2009). However, as pointed to before, uncertainty is inherent
to complex technology (development) (Sollie 2007, 2009).
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(the fact/value distinction) especially insofar as facts do not logically entail
value. In other words, ‘is’ does not imply ‘ought’ (the naturalistic fallacy). In
this way, values cannot be motivated only by an empirical account of the
external world, but depend substantively on the interests and desires of human
beings within a cultural milieu (italics added)
Yet the conﬂation of facts and values is exactly what happens when the value
stances of stakeholders are taken as the normative input for the VSD of a
technology. The ﬁnal (italicized) part of the quotation points exactly to the weak
spot in this case: when Friedman et al. claim that values depend substantively on the
interests and desires of human beings within a cultural milieu, this implies a
sociological conception of values rather than an ethical one. Hence, this is a
naturalistic interpretation of values that is running straight against Moore’s account.
What are Values?
Fourth, the concept of ‘values’ is central to VSD: VSD claims that human values
and ethical issues do not stand apart from technology, but are fundamentally part of
our technological practices. Technology, especially IT, has a rising impact on
society and human lives; it may either support or undermine certain values. As
explained, the starting point for VSD is to identify stakeholders and values in
technology (design), with the ultimate objective of incorporating values into
technology by means of design decisions. Given that values are of paramount
importance for VSD, I claim that more attention should be given to the
conceptualisation of this notion.
As the starting point for exploring ethics and values in relation to technology
design, Friedman and Kahn (2003) raise a series of questions. They ask,
if human values, especially those with ethical import […] are important, they
are no less controversial. What values count? Who decides? Are values
relative? Or are some values universal, but expressed differently across culture
and context? Does technology even have values? […] [O]n what basis do
some values override others in the design of, say, hardware, algorithms,
databases, and interfaces?
Although this outset seems promising from the perspective of ethics of
technology, Friedman et al. remain descriptive with regard to the conceptualization
of values. They describe a set of values ‘‘often impacted upon by technology’’.
These are concepts that are certainly central to human existence, including major
moral concepts such as autonomy, justice, and trust. (2006) However, the deﬁnitions
of these concepts remain abstract. Friedman et al. characterize the values they
mention only brieﬂy. Consider the value of autonomy, which Friedman and Kahn
(2003) deﬁne as ‘people’s ability to decide, plan, and act in ways that they believe
will help them to achieve their goals’ This (rather instrumental) deﬁnition of
autonomy is formulated in such general terms that it can hardly function as a
practical concept for implementing values in design from an ethics of technology
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of values just as much as the normative ethical question concerning which values
matter, why, and to what degree. Maybe they do so because the ultimate
conceptualization of each speciﬁc value should be left to each speciﬁc VSD.
9 Yet
Friedman et al. remain rather vague on the conceptual level.
Illustrative of this is the way Friedman et al. discuss ‘UrbanSim,’ a project on
integrated land use, transportation, and environmental simulation. They notice that
stakeholders raise widely divergent values, and then ask how to prioritise and weigh
these values. The solution offered in this case is a web-based interface in which
stakeholders can ‘select indicators that speak to values that are important for them’
(Friedman et al. 2006). Notwithstanding the attractiveness and praiseworthiness of
this undertaking, it seems VSD offers no methodological account for distinguishing
genuine moral values from mere preferences, wishes and whims of those involved in
the design process.
Notwithstanding this critique, Friedman and Kahn take a position with respect to
values (in general) as they state (2003) that VSD defends what they call a ‘middle
position’ between moral universality and moral variability. Both extremes, they
claim, are surrounded by problems: moral universality cannot ﬁnd or ground its
starting point for morality, i.e. a core set of values central to its moral conviction(s),
whereas moral variability has problems regarding values shared among different
groups or cultures (as a result of which values lose their meaning, cf. the problem of
moral relativism). This leads Friedman and Kahn (2003) to adopt a middle ground,
which:
allows for an analysis of universal moral values, as well as allowing for these
values to play out differently in a particular culture at a particular point of
time. […] The general principle then is that designs need to be robust enough
to substantiate the value under consideration and yet adaptable enough so that
different cultures (or subcultures) can use the design in their own way.
Flanagan et al. (2006) argue by the same token that:
the study of values in technologies pushes us to ask questions about origins
and sources that are far from settled in the general study of moral and political
values. In the absence of clear answers to these questions, recourse to a
pragmatic middle-ground seems reasonable. This means going along with the
idea of a hierarchy of values in which a ‘‘thin’’ set are taken as common to all
humanity and thicker sets associated with groups and subgroups of varying
sizes and compositions […] On the issue whether values can be derived,
analytically, or must be discovered, empirically, a middle-ground sees virtue
in both, drawing conceptual clarity and normative justiﬁcation from theoret-
ical works in moral and political philosophy, while supplementing these with
knowledge about actual interpretations and value commitments of populations
relevant to technologies under study.
9 I thank Ibo van de Poel for drawing my attention to this point.
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put forward by Van den Hoven as most practicable for ethics of information
technology. [Van den Hoven 2008, referring to Norman Daniels, 1979, James
Grifﬁn, 1993, and John Rawls] Just like the middle position of VSD however, this
method is contested due to its lack of clarity. It results in questions regarding the
tenability of the ‘thin’ or universal values VSD puts forward: if values are
universally valid for one thing but play out differently in various contexts for
another, how can we avoid relativist arguments? Consider the value of human
dignity: it is true that any culture can subscribe to this value. Yet what is left of its
(universalist) meaning if the substance given to it differs in each context? In the one
culture or context the value of human dignity may be taken as the basic principle to
treat people equally, regardless of their race, skin colour, or religion. Yet in another
context, the very same value may have an oppressing effect on people (even if
unintentionally). Just consider historical and cultural examples regarding differ-
ences in dignity, e.g. of women vs men, or ‘black’ vs. ‘white’ people. In the case of
(new) technologies with global impact, such as the Internet, mobile communication,
and airplanes, the differences among various interpretations of values become even
more pressing. A technology that is introduced in two or more cultures with
different conceptions of a value affects the moral emotions regarding the
technology, including its uses and consequences, in different ways. For this reason
I think that the ‘middle position’ Friedman and Kahn adhere to, is subject to what is
called ‘buck-passing’: at the end of the day, the problem is not solved but resurfaces
elsewhere. What is lacking is the complementation of VSD with a justiﬁcatory
theory of values, as will show below.
To recapitulate: the main criticism concerning the notion of values in VSD is that
this notion remains underdeveloped. VSD should, in view of a normative approach
for ethics of technology, explicate the difference between descriptive and normative
values, i.e. what stakeholders factually consider important versus what they should
regard as important. If this is lacking, the list of values runs the risk of becoming
arbitrary, and any value serving the particular interests of designers (including the
initiators and potential customers) may become a serious threat for VSD.
In Need of Ethical Theory
The ﬁnal point of attention for VSD from an ethics of technology perspective
concerns the integration of ethical theory and analysis. Mary Cummings (2006)
suggests ‘VSD provides a road map […] on how to include ethical considerations
into design projects, even if they are not trained in philosophy or ethics.’ Although I
agree that VSD might be able to include ethical considerations in design, I claim that
in order to successfully meet this objective, VSD requires complimentary ethical
theory and expertise.
Above, I address the conceptualisation of values. Now I will discuss the ordering
and weighing of values: What values have priority over others? Are certain values
paramount? From the literature it is not clear how VSD purports dealing with
conﬂicting and incommensurable values (see e.g. Van de Poel 2009). This leads to
questions of how decisions should be made—and justiﬁed accordingly—in case of
282 N. Manders-Huits
123conﬂicting values. Notably, there are two sources of conﬂicting values: persistent
disagreement between people (epistemological source) or dilemmas where trade-
offs have to be made (ontological source).
Now let us return to the example of the medical support-system; as mentioned
this system is opaque, so we do not know exactly how it calculates or comes to its
results. Nor do we, as patients, know the alternative treatments available to us,
besides those suggested by the system. The design of such a (medical) system
involves a variety of human values and associated questions, e.g.:
• Trust—is it possible to design a system that is technologically safe and sound,
and that functions well so that it can be trusted both by physicians and patients?
• Privacy—is all the information collected necessary in order to generate the
output, and is the database that contains the data about the questions and results
protected against unauthorised access?
• Bias—is the medical system free from bias towards a speciﬁc preference for one
treatment over the other; is the system not secretly a system produced or
sponsored by a pharmaceutical company favouring one of their products?
• Autonomy—to what extent can the patient express his or her preferences
regarding life and well-being?
In this example, as in most cases of technology (if not all), multiple values play a
role. How do we compare and order these different values?
It becomes clear that VSD cannot be taken as a normative account in which
competing values can be balanced and traded off as per a certain principle. In
complex design situations, there is no clear-cut way to balance competing values
such as autonomy and trust, or freedom from bias and privacy, This raises an
important question: who makes the ﬁnal decision on how to prioritize these
competing values? Is this left up to the majority of stakeholders to decide, i.e. when
a certain value is ranked as important by a certain percentage of people, or is it left
up to the designers? As argued by Van den Hoven (2010), we engage in ethics to
come to reasoned solutions and clariﬁcations to practical problems, such as value
trade-offs. Although different conceptual ethical frameworks lead to different
descriptions of the situation, ethical theory nonetheless provides for sources of
moral arguments and moral considerations (Van den Hoven 2010). Therefore, I
claim that VSD should be complemented with an explicit ethical theory.
Concluding Remarks for VSD
VSD is an attractive approach for assessing values in (technology) design by means
of an iterative process between conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations.
In this section, VSD has been discussed as a potential methodology for ethics of
technology. Despite its promising character, it turns out that VSD falls short in
several respects. It cannot yet be considered as a fruitful methodology for
implementing values in design from a normative perspective. Therefore, for VSD to
be applied as an eligible methodology for ethics of technology, the issues raised in
this article need to be dealt with ﬁrst. At present VSD suffers from the following
deﬁciencies: (1) VSD does not have a clear methodology for identifying
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within the methodology of VSD is obscure, (3) VSD runs the risk of committing the
naturalistic fallacy when using empirical knowledge for implementing values in
design, (4) the concept of values, as well as their realization, is left undetermined
and (5) VSD lacks complimentary or explicit ethical theory for dealing with value
trade-offs.
I claim that in order for VSD to function as a methodology for implementing
values in design from an ethics of technology perspective, it needs to give more
explicit attention to its value aims and assumptions. At this point the value analysis
of VSD is descriptive rather than normative, leading to the question of whether VSD
can reach its original objective of enlarging the scope of human values to include all
values, especially those with moral import. For the normative evaluation of a
technology an explicit and justiﬁed ethical starting point or principle is required.
Towards Value Conscious Design
This paper was meant to explore the criteria of adequacy for a methodology of
ethics of technology for implementing moral values into technology. VSD was
taken as the prime candidate for such a methodology. However, what has been
shown is that VSD lacks a normative, ethical component in order for it to meet the
criteria for implementing (moral) values into design in an ethically justiﬁed manner.
Taking values into account is not the same as normative reasoning. For this reason, I
claim that applying VSD as it currently stands is a bridge too far for ethics of
technology. For our purpose, technology should not only be made ‘sensitive’ to
values, in other words, account for value considerations, but instead the objective
should be to have technology consciously and deliberately designed to include
ethical value considerations. I therefore propose to complement VSD with the
following criteria:
(1) The clariﬁcation and explanation of the overall (ethical) objective in view of a
methodology of integrating moral values in design. In other words, the
methodology to be used for implementing moral values into design needs to be
explicit regarding its normative aims. What is the goal we wish to obtain?
What entities are considered ‘values,’ is it desirable to make a technology
sensitive to values in general, or primarily to moral values?
(2) The next step is the explication of the ethical theory to be used. As discussed,
VSD is in need of complementary ethical theory. By means of ethical theory, a
light can be shed on ethical issues and associated moral arguments and
considerations. To my view, making ethical deliberation explicit is crucial for
a normative account; this way, relevant ethical concepts and value choices can
be clearly identiﬁed and design decisions motivated accordingly.
(3) Related to the previous points is the necessity for a clear-cut delineation of the
(practical) objectives in each speciﬁc design situation with regard to the values
to be considered in design. This includes a speciﬁcation of whose values are to
be considered (which stakeholders), what empirical methods are to be used,
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input without losing sight of ethical objectives (cf. (1)).
(4) The safeguarding and monitoring of the process of incorporating moral values
into design, e.g. by including a ‘values advocate’ in the design team (see
Manders-Huits and Zimmer 2007, 2009). This person is concerned with the
effects of (1), (2), and (3) by (a) identifying and motivating choices for
including certain stakeholders and leaving out others, (b) explicating value
conﬂicts and trade-offs, and (c) questioning and evaluating (design) choices in
light of overall (moral) aims.
In conclusion, for an approach as VSD to become eligible as a normative account
for integrating and implementing moral values into design, I propose to complement
it with the explication of an ethical theory. This way, technology is not only made
sensitive to moral values, but can also be consciously and deliberately designed that
way.
10 I’d like to term this alternative reading of implementing moral values in
design ‘‘Value Conscious Design.’’
11 By means of engaging in Value Conscious
Design ethics is implemented in design, thereby activating ethical expertise for the
beneﬁt of improving our (technological) environment.
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